Thomas Olick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-2-2021 
Thomas Olick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Thomas Olick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 715. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/715 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






THOMAS W. OLICK, 





COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; CITY OF EASTON;  
EASTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER BRUNEO;  
SERGEANT MARRACCINI; LIEUTENANT LOHENITZ 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 5-15-cv-05786 & 5-15-cv-05820, consolidated) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 12, 2021 
Before:  CHAGARES, PHIPPS, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Thomas W. Olick appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after a jury trial, in favor of Defendant, Sergeant 
Marraccini1 of the Easton Police Force.  Olick also appeals the District Court’s orders 
entered on November 6 and December 20, 2019.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment and orders. 
 As we write primarily for the parties, we assume familiarity with the facts and 
procedural history of this case.  Pertinent here, in August 2015, Olick went to the Easton 
Police Department to file a complaint against a police officer.  A different police officer, 
Sergeant Marraccini, came to the lobby to talk to Olick about the complaint.  Video 
surveillance footage shows that after a verbal confrontation, Olick approached 
Marraccini, touching his nose.  Marraccini pushed him back.  Olick fell.  Marraccini 
arrested Olick for harassment.  Olick was then taken to a hospital for treatment of his 
shoulder.  Olick later was criminally convicted of the summary offense of harassment by 
physical contact. 
Later in 2015, Olick filed a complaint in the District Court against Marraccini and 
several other defendants, raising a number of claims.  The District Court granted the 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Olick appealed.  We dismissed his appeal in part, 
affirmed the District Court’s judgment in part, and vacated it in part.  We remanded to the 
 
1 Sergeant Marraccini’s name is spelled in various ways in the record, including in our 
caption, which is copied from the District Court.  We have opted to correct the spelling in 
this opinion.  See Supplemental Appendix, Vol. I, App. Dkt. #59-1 at 74 (Sergeant 
Marraccini spelling his name in a hearing). 
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District Court for further proceedings as to Olick’s excessive force claim against 
Marraccini.  See Olick v. Pennsylvania, 739 F. App’x 722, 727 (3d Cir. 2018) (per 
curiam, not precedential). 
On remand, Marraccini answered Olick’s complaint and added a counterclaim in 
recoupment against Olick for assault and battery.  Amended Answer & Counterclaim, 
Dkt. #43.  The District Court denied Olick’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim.  Order, 
Dkt. #58.  Following a hearing on pending motions, see Dkt. #119, the District Court 
reiterated in a November 6, 2019 pretrial order that the counterclaim could proceed.  
Order, Dkt. #95.  In the same order, the District Court granted Marraccini’s motion in 
limine, precluding Olick from introducing at trial propensity evidence against Marraccini.  
Id.  
Soon after, Olick filed a “Motion to preclude Defendant’s Exhibits D-19, D-20 
and D-212 and to Enter an Order Finding that Defendant, his Counsel and Witness 
Captain Beitler Engaged in Contempt of Court.”  Dkt. #99.  After another hearing, the 
District Court, in a December 20, 2019 order, granted Olick’s motion to the extent that 
 
2 Defendants discovered and produced these three documents after the police criminal 
investigation had concluded.  Exhibit D-19 is an Administrative Investigation Report, 
summarizing steps and interviews in the investigation process.  Although Olick received 
this summary late in the game, he already had received the reports and videos described 
in the summary.  Exhibit D-20 is an Easton Police Department Internal Investigation 
Checklist—no substantive information is included on the form; the form simply checks 
off the steps taken.  Exhibit D-21 is a Notice of Disposition, explaining that Olick’s 
complaint was unfounded and that Sergeant Marraccini had not violated the police 
department’s policy.  Although Olick had not received this “disposition” report 
previously, he was aware of the Department’s conclusions. 
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Marraccini was not allowed to introduce Exhibits D-19, D-20, and D-21 unless Olick 
“open[ed] the door to their admission, in which case [Marraccini could] use these exhibits 
as rebuttal evidence.”  Order, Dkt. #112.  The District Court denied Olick’s request to 
hold Marraccini, his counsel, and his witness in contempt for allegedly failing to produce 
certain documents in discovery.  Id.3   
The matter proceeded to a three-day trial before a jury.  The jury determined that 
Sergeant Marraccini did not intentionally violate Olick’s right to be free from excessive 
force.  Verdict, Dkt. #143.  The District Court entered a civil judgment in favor of 
Marraccini and against Olick, Dkt. #142, and dismissed Marraccini’s counterclaim 
against Olick, Dkt. #147.  Olick timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Olick raises two issues on appeal.  
The first is that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for 
sanctions based on the Defendants’ alleged discovery violations and when the Court 
denied Olick further discovery.  We review a district court’s rulings on discovery matters 
for abuse of discretion.  Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis, U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 402 (3d 
Cir. 2016).   
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Olick’s 
discovery motions.  As the District Court noted, to the extent Olick asked for a contempt 
 
3 Olick filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking to appeal the orders entered on November 6 
and December 20, 2019.  We dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  See C.A. No. 
20-1005 (order entered Jan. 10, 2020).  We also dismissed Olick’s petition for permission 
to appeal.  See C.A. No. 20-8002 (order entered Jan. 10, 2020). 
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ruling, no such ruling was warranted as the Defendants were not under any court order 
compelling them to produce particular documents.  And while the Defendants did 
produce three documents soon before trial (Exhibits D-19, D-20, and D-21), Olick was 
not prejudiced by their late production.  First, the District Court granted Olick’s motion to 
preclude introduction of the documents at trial.  And more importantly, nothing in those 
documents supported Olick’s claims that Marraccini used excessive force against him.  
Olick’s other allegations, of “spoilage” and “concealment” of documents, are not 
supported by the record. 
Olick’s second argument on appeal is that the District Court denied him a full and 
fair jury trial when it (1) allowed Marraccini’s counterclaim to proceed, but (2) did not 
submit the counterclaim to the jury.  We need not consider whether the District Court 
erred in either respect, because even if it did, Olick’s argument is moot.  Marraccini’s 
counterclaim was for recoupment—he sought “damages . . . in an amount not to exceed 
any award of damages granted to Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiff’s Complaint.”  Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim, Dkt. #43 at 17.  Because the jury awarded Olick no damages, 
the District Court properly dismissed Marraccini’s counterclaim in recoupment.  See 
Order, Dkt. #147.  And because Olick has provided us with no reason to overturn the 
jury’s verdict, we can grant no relief with regards to Marraccini’s counterclaim.  See 
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021) (“[I]f in the course of litigation a 
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court finds that it can no longer provide a plaintiff with any effectual relief, the case 
generally is moot.”).4 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
4 Olick’s brief could generously be construed as raising a third issue, challenging the 
District Court’s ruling to disallow evidence that would purportedly show Marraccini’s 
propensity for using excessive force.  But Olick does not explain how the District Court 
erred in that regard, since “Rule 404(b) [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] prohibits the 
admission of other acts evidence for the purpose of showing that an individual has 
a propensity or disposition to act in a particular manner.”  Ansell v. Green Acres 
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2003).  We discern no abuse of discretion in 
the District Court’s ruling.  See id. at 519 (explaining that if evidence could be admissible 
in some circumstances, we review a district court’s ruling on that evidence for abuse of 
discretion). 
 
